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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) granting jurisdiction over appeals transferred by the Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the district court correct in dismissing plaintiffs medical negligence 
claim for failure to diagnose breast cancer, when it is undisputed that 
there has been no recurrence following her treatment? 
The proper standard of review of this issue on appeal is correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial courfs conclusions. White v. Deeselhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 
(Utah 1994). This Court may affirm on any ground available to the district court, even if it 
is not one relied upon below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 
1993), rehearing denied June 28, 1993. 
This issue was raised in Defendants5 Joint Motion For Dismissal Without Prejudice, 
dated July 30, 2002. (R. at 00111.) 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical negligence case brought by plaintiff/appellant Jamie Medved against 
C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. and the Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. 
Dr. Glenn was Mrs. Medved's obstetrician/gynecologist. (R. at 00006.) 
Mrs. Medved claims that Dr. Glenn negligently failed to order diagnostic testing and 
follow-up treatment after she presented to him in 1997 with a lump in her right breast. (R. 
at 00004.) 
Mrs. Medved later saw Dr. Hirsche, a plastic surgeon, inquiring about breast 
augmentation. Because of her report of a lump in her right breast, Dr. Hirsche ordered a 
mammogram, which was performed on July 20, 1998, and was read as normal and showing 
that the lump was benign. On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed a bilateral breast 
augmentation, at which time he also performed a needle aspiration of three suspected right 
breast nodules. Because there was insufficient fluid from the aspiration, no aspirate was sent 
for pathological examination. (R. at 00165.) Dr. Hirsche continued to clinically follow 
Mrs. Medved, and when the lumps persisted, he performed an excisional biopsy on 
December 16, 1998. Pathological examination of the biopsied tumors on December 16, 
1998, revealed the presence of infiltrating ductal carcinoma. (R. at 00164.) 
Mrs. Medved claims that it was negligent for Dr. Hirsche to proceed with her breast 
augmentation on August 12, 1998, and that he should, instead, have excised the breast 
lumps at that time when aspiration of the lumps did not produce sufficient fluid and/or 
tissue for pathological examination. Thus, she claims that Dr. Hirsche's diagnosis of breast 
cancer was delayed for four months. (R. at 00002.) 
Mrs. Medved alleges that the delay of both defendant physicians in diagnosing her 
cancer caused her to undergo more extensive therapy for cancer than would have been 
necessary if a timely diagnosis had been made, i.e., a modified radical mastectomy rather 
than a lumpectomy. (R. at 00003, 00002.) She also claims that the delayed diagnosis and 
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treatment increased her risk of experiencing a recurrence of the cancer, although she has not 
had any such recurrence. (Id.) 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 5, 2001. (R. at 00007.) On July 30, 2002, 
defendants filed a Joint Motion For Dismissal Without Prejudice on the grounds that, 
under Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), no cognizable claim existed unless and 
until Mrs. Medved experiences a recurrence of her cancer. The Joint Motion to Dismiss 
focused solely on the issue of whether legal injury has occurred under Seale. Whether 
defendants5 treatment of Mrs. Medved was negligent and whether the alleged delay has 
caused any decrease in her long-term prognosis were not issues before the Court on the 
Motion to Dismiss and remain in dispute. (R. at 00118 - 113.) 
After full briefing and oral argument, the District Court Judge, Lynn W. Davis, 
ruled in favor of defendants and entered an Order Granting Defendants' Motion For 
Dismissal Without Prejudice on March 19, 2003. (R. at 00216 - 209.) Plaintiff now 
appeals from that Order of dismissal. (R. at 00218.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were presented to the district court in support of Defendants5 
Joint Motion For Dismissal. They were not disputed by Mrs. Medved.l 
1
 Because defendants cited deposition testimony and other evidence in the district 
court record, but beyond the allegations of the Complaint, the Court could have treated the 
Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. It makes no difference at this 
point, because either way the standard of appellate review is correctness. Whether the issue 
is treated as a motion to dismiss or as a motion for summary judgment is also immaterial, 
because the dismissal sought and granted is without prejudice to re-file in the event of 
recurrence. 
1. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991. (R. at 00165.) 
2. Plaintiffs last visit with Dr. Glenn was February 27, 1998. (Id.) 
3. During the time plaintiff was a patient of Dr. Glenn, she was diagnosed with 
fibrocystic benign lumps in her breasts. (Id.) 
4. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hirsche as a patient on July 13, 1998. (Id.) 
5. A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed on July 20, 1998, 
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally, no significant abnormality and no evidence 
of malignancy. (Id.) 
6. On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation 
and needle aspiration of three suspected right breast nodules. (Id.) 
7. On December 16, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of three 
right breast nodules. (R. at 00164.) 
8. The pathological examination associated with the December 16, 1998, 
excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma. (Id.) 
9. On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified 
radical mastectomy. (Id.) 
10. Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy and later had surgical breast reconstruction. (Id.) 
11. Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer. (Id.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law precludes plaintiff from recovering for an increased future risk of cancer 
recurrence. In Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "an alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for 
negligence." Seale, 923 P.2d at 1365. This case is factually indistinguishable from Seale. 
Because plaintiff has not suffered a recurrence of cancer, she is unable to establish a legal 
injury to satisfy her prima facie claims of medical negligence against Drs. Glenn and 
Hirsche. The arguable fact that the alleged delay in diagnosis might have necessitated 
additional or more extensive treatment does not distinguish this case from Seale, as those 
same circumstances were present in Seale. The district court's granting of Defendants' Joint 
Motion For Dismissal Without Prejudice was correct and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE LOSS OF 
CHANCE AS A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE INJURY, 
Plaintiff introduces her argument on appeal by contending that Utah courts 
recognize a cause of action where negligence increases a person's risk of harm. According to 
plaintiff, the "right" to pursue an action for increased risk of harm was established by this 
Court in George v LPS Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff further 
argues that the Utah Supreme Court, in Seale, limited the ability to impose liability for 
increasing a party's risk of harm to cases in which the increased risk of harm is accompanied 
by actual damages. 
These basic premises of plaintiffs entire argument are flawed in several respects. 
First, plaintiffs contentions imply that there were no actual damages suffered by the 
plaintiff in George. However, George was a wrongful death suit in which plaintiff alleged 
that his decedenfs death from sepsis was, in part, due to the negligent failure of LDS 
Hospital staff to take measures which might have reversed her condition. Additionally, 
plaintiff presumes that the George court recognized that an increased risk of harm caused by 
negligence constitutes an injury under Utah law. An examination of the facts and analysis 
contained in the opinion however, reveals that the George court determined that an 
increased risk of harm due to negligent actions or omissions can, in some instances, 
establish proximate cause of a resulting injury. In the George case, death, not increased risk, 
was the actual injury. Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Seale did not, as plaintiff 
contends, confirm that increased risk of future harm is itself an injury, compensable under 
Utah law. Moreover, the Seale Court expressly rejected the notion that an action could be 
brought for negligent harm to one's chance of disease free survival absent proof of actual 
loss. cc[E]ven though there exists a possibility, even a probability, of future harm, it is not 
enough to sustain a claim, and a plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests itself." Seale, 
923 P.2d at 1364 (citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts,' 30, at 165). 
George involved a wrongful death claim grounded in allegations of medical 
malpractice related to the treatment of Mrs. Betty George by LDS Hospital. Mrs. George 
died as a result of a sepsis-induced cardiac arrest several days after a seemingly 
uncomplicated hysterectomy. The factual evidence presented at trial showed that hospital 
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nurses were aware that Mrs. George's condition was deteriorating for a period of several 
hours but failed to inform her physicians of abnormal signs and symptoms. The jury found 
that, although the nurses5 failure to inform the physicians constituted negligence, it was not 
a proximate cause of the patient's death. On appeal, plaintiff argued that jury instructions 
improperly implied that there could be only one proximate cause of injury, thereby 
preventing the jury from finding that the nurses5 failure to act was a contributing and 
proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. The issue on appeal was one of negligence and 
proximate cause, namely whether a negligent act which merely contributes to injury, but is 
not the sole cause of injury, constitutes proximate cause. This Court, finding that a jury 
could have reasonably concluded that the nurses5 failure to notify physicians of 
Mrs. George's deteriorating condition was a proximate cause of her death, and that the trial 
court's jury instructions were therefore improper, reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
George, 797 P.2d at 1122. 
In its analysis, the George court found that facts presented at trial supported the 
plaintiffs position that the nurses5 negligence was a contributing cause of Mrs. George's 
death. In so doing, the court found that, if the nurses had notified physicians of 
Mrs. George's symptoms, they may have taken measures to treat the sepsis before the 
ultimately fatal cardiac arrest. Their failure to act therefore, operated to reduce the patient's 
chances for recovery. Id. It is this characterization of the mechanism of causation which is 
sometimes erroneously interpreted as establishing a loss of chance cause of action. As has 
been explained however, the reduced chance of recovery and increased risk of harm 
described in George are identified as the possible contributing cause of injury, not the injury 
itself. "A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of the nurses to notify 
Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's change in condition prevented them from 
diagnosing, treating, and possibly saving her life and that this failure therefore was a 
proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing death.55 Id. (Emphasis added.) The 
holding in George simply does not support plaintiffs argument that decreased chance for 
recovery constitutes an injury under Utah law. 
In Andersen v Brigham Young University, 879 F. Supp. 1124 (D. Utah 1995), the 
United States District Court had occasion to interpret George when it was presented in 
essentially the same manner as plaintiff attempts to use it here. Andersen, a diversity action, 
involved a medical malpractice claim brought by a BYU student against the BYU 
McDonald Health Center. The plaintiff alleged that physicians at the health center failed to 
timely diagnose his Hodgkin5s Disease. He sought recovery for a reduced chance of survival 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Utah law does not recognize a 
loss of chance cause of action, the court granted BYU5s motion for summary judgment on 
the claim for reduced chance of survival. In so doing, the court explained that George does 
not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance. 
The [George] court cited Hicks and other loss of chance cases 
for the proposition that where the chances of saving a life 
would be increased absent negligence or malpractice, a jury 
could find such negligence or malpractice to be a proximate 
cause of subsequent injury or death. George is distinguishable 
from the facts in this case, however. In George, there was an 
actual injury suffered because the patient died. George does not 
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purport to recognize or create a new cause of action for mere 
reduction of statistical chances for survival. 
Andersen, 879 F. Supp. at 1129. (Emphasis added.) 
As the Andersen opinion demonstrates, the holding in George does not establish a 
cause of action for reduced chance of recovery or increased risk of harm. Language in 
George regarding increased risk of harm and reduced chance of recovery describes a 
potential mechanism for establishing proximate cause of subsequent injury. We respectfully 
submit that the Andersen opinion provides a well-reasoned explanation of this Court's 
holding in George and accurately describes the status of Utah law with respect to the loss of 
chance doctrine. "This Court is satisfied that Utah has not adopted a separate cause of 
action permitting recovery for the reduction of a statistical chance of long-term survival.55 
Andersen. 879 F. Supp. at 1130. 
Admittedly, under George, acts or omissions which increase the risk of cancer 
recurrence could be shown, in certain circumstances, to be a proximate cause of an actual 
recurrence of cancer. However, a legally cognizable injury will not exist, and plaintiffs 
cause of action will not accrue, unless and until the disease recurs. Further, it is Seale, not 
George, which, under facts virtually identical to the instant case, addresses the issue of 
whether Utah law permits recovery for a reduced chance of recurrence of cancer. Right 
now, Ms. Medved has the best result possible (the absence of cancer), regardless of when 
her cancer was diagnosed. This is the clear rationale expressed in Seale for finding no legal 
injury has yet occurred. 
POINT n 
PLAINTIFF FAILS TO DISTINGUISH HER 
INJURIES FROM THOSE HELD TO BE LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT IN SEALE v. GOWANS. 
The only facts necessary to support the district court's ruling in favor of defendants 
are: (1) plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for alleged negligent delay in diagnosis of 
breast cancer; and (2) since her treatment for the cancer she has had no recurrence. These 
facts alone mandate dismissal under controlling Utah law. The question before the district 
court was purely a question of law turning on the interpretation of the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in Seale. 
The essence of Seale is that no claim can be brought for a delay or failure to diagnose 
cancer, until such time as the cancer recurs. It is that simple: 
As a result, even though there exists a possibility, even a 
probability, of future harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, 
and a plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests itself. 
Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364. 
[W]e find that defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale 
suffered a legally cognizable injury when she discovered that the 
cancer had spread to her lymph nodes. 
Id. 
As discussed hereafter, if Ms. Seale's cancer had not recurred, 
she could not have recovered for an enhanced risk of the 
cancer's recurrence. 
Id. at 1362, n.2. 
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Just as she argued below, plaintiffs argument to this Court is entirely based on an 
unsuccessful attempt to distinguish this case from Seale. Mrs. Medved claims that her case 
is unlike Seale because she has suffered actual present damages in the form of more 
extensive surgery which would not have been necessary if the defendants had diagnosed her 
cancer earlier. (Appellant's Brf. at 12.) The attempt to distinguish this case from Seale is, 
however, without basis. In fact, Ms. Seale had similar "actual35 damages when she received 
the correct diagnosis and subsequent treatment more than two years prior to 
commencement of her lawsuit. In May 1988, approximately one year after Dr. Gowans5 
alleged failure to detect the breast cancer, Ms. Seale obtained a correct diagnosis and 
underwent a radical mastectomy, followed by radiation and hormone treatment. At the 
time of the surgery, it was also discovered that she had developed a second malignant tumor 
and the cancer had spread to eight of her lymph nodes. Seale, 923 P.2d at 1362. 
In the present case, Mrs. Medved also had positive lymph nodes by the time her 
cancer was diagnosed. (R. at 00164; Appellant's Brf., at 4.) In Seale, the Court noted 
evidence that "women who have small tumors with no positive nodes have long-term 
survival in excess of 85 percent, 90 percent. When the lymph nodes are involved, it drops 
significantly, to slightly under 50 percent, and the more lymph nodes that are involved the 
higher the probabilities are that we're dealing with systemic disease.55 Seale, at 1364, n.6. 
The "actual55 injuries alleged by Mrs. Medved are legally no different in nature than 
those actual injuries suffered by Ms. Seale. Both women presented evidence that they had 
undergone more extensive surgery and/or therapy than they would have had if the cancer 
had been diagnosed earlier by the defendant physicians. 
In Seate, the very same argument now made by Mrs. Medved was, in fact, presented 
to the Utah Supreme Court and rejected. Dr. Gowans argued in his Petition for Rehearing 
that the record demonstrated that Ms. Seale had not only knowledge of injury in the form 
of an increased risk of recurrence of cancer, but she also had knowledge of "actual present 
damage55 in the form of past radiation and hormone therapy--"additional treatment that 
would not have been necessary had the cancer been detected earlier.55 See Petition pp. 2-7, 
R. at 00149 - 142.) The Supreme Court rejected this argument, denying the Petition For 
Rehearing on October 2, 1996. (R. at 00136.) The Utah Supreme Court plainly did not 
consider such damages sufficient to support a claim in a case for failed or delayed diagnosis 
of cancer. This is because of the basic policy premise of the Seale opinion. 
Because there is no question that the same argument and facts were presented to the 
Supreme Court in Seale, the district court was constrained to follow the controlling law and 
outcome in that case. Seale remains the most recent controlling law directly on point and 
plaintiff has failed to present any argument or rationale for changing this controlling law. 
POINT m 
SEALE REQUIRES THAT ALL PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
ARE PRESERVED AND MAY BE ASSERTED ONLY 
AT SUCH TIME AS THERE IS A RECURRENCE OF 
CANCER. 
The essence of plaintiffs argument is that Seale suggests that the one action rule 
allows her to maintain her claim for damages based on enhanced risk of future cancer as 
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long as she can identify any type of present injury, such as having received more extensive 
treatment. This argument turns Seale on its head, again ignoring both the underlying facts 
in Seale and the basic premise of the Court's opinion. 
The Supreme Court in Seale did state that the one action rule precludes splitting 
causes of action and the filing of multiple lawsuits arising out of the same alleged wrongful 
act. What plaintiff misses is the fact that the Court made a policy-based decision that the 
one action rule should be applied to avoid the assertion of speculative claims and to preserve 
all claims until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. Only by such a ruling could the 
Court assure that a plaintiff would not be forced to file a premature lawsuit on the chance 
that her cancer might recur, while still protecting a plaintiff from the argument that 
awareness of speculative or minor injury would start the statute running and preclude a later 
claim when the recurrence manifested a real and substantial injury. The Court noted: 
[M]any of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce the 
necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more likely 
to occur than not. Yet if the harm, such as the recurrence of 
cancer, actually later occurs, the plaintiff would be precluded 
from any recovery for devastating injuries by reason of having 
acquired an earlier claim for purely speculative ones. We 
believe that the better approach is to wait until the potential 
harm manifests itself, allowing for more certain proof and fewer 
speculative lawsuits. 
Seale, 923 P.2d at 1366. 
Seale poses problems for both plaintiffs and defendants in cancer diagnosis cases. A 
plaintiff might argue that it is unfair to prevent her from a present recovery of existing 
damages for having undergone more extensive surgery or cancer treatment. She is, 
however, insulated from the running of the statute of limitations and assured that she will 
not be without a remedy if the worst (recurrence of the cancer) occurs in the future. In 
short, premature and relatively minor damage cases are precluded (or delayed) in favor of 
preserving full rights to a remedy for the devastating and non-speculative damage cases. A 
defendant physician might argue that the effect of Seale is unfair because it prevents the 
running of the statute of limitations indefinitely, even where the plaintiff is aware of a 
misdiagnosis. Seale, however, protects the physician from speculative claims and multiple 
lawsuits arising from the same treatment.2 
The Utah Supreme Court balanced these different interests in Seale and made a 
sound decision that there shall be only one cause of action in these cases and it will not 
accrue until such time as there is a recurrence of the cancer. Ms. Medved may not like this 
outcome now, but it affords her future protection in the event the worst happens, and it is 
the controlling law in this State. 
2
 The policy decision announced in Seale is sound. It must be remembered that 
when a physician speaks to a cancer patient about prognosis for future recurrence, it is in 
the context of statistical possibilities that cannot be applied to an individual case. 
Accordingly, if a breast cancer patient is told that she has an 85 percent chance of no 
recurrence in ten years, she also has a 15 percent chance of recurrence. There is no way to 
know, unless there is a recurrence, which statistical possibility will come to fruition in any 
individual case. Thus, there will be breast cancer patients who are diagnosed early with 
stage one cancer who receive appropriate treatment and who will, nevertheless, have a 
recurrence; and there will be breast cancer patients-and Mrs. Medved may be one-who are 
diagnosed for the first time when their cancer is stage two, who will never have a 
recurrence. The holding in Seale avoids burdening courts with the trial of hypothetical 
injury cases, while at the same time preserving a plaintiffs potential claim until such time as 
an actual injury occurs. 
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As she did below, plaintiff again mistakenly relies on Swain v. Curry, 595 So.2d 168 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 601 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1992). The defendants, 
who did not prevail in Seale, also cited Swain in support of their argument. The Supreme 
Court, expressly declined to follow Swain and rejected defendants5 argument. Swain was 
distinguishable not only on the facts, but also on the law. An important consideration in 
Swain was the Florida statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, which 
commences to run when a patient knows of either a breach of the standard of care or a 
physical injury. Swain, at 171 and n.4. Thus, in Swain the Florida court had to be 
concerned with the possibility of the statute of limitations running to preclude a 
misdiagnosis case even where there was no injury.3 The Court solved the problem by 
allowing the patient to proceed with a claim for possible recurrence of cancer. In Utah, the 
state Supreme Court is faced with a different statute of limitations standard which requires 
knowledge of both the physical injury and the possibility that it was caused by medical 
negligence before the statute will commence to run.4 The Utah Supreme Court has thus 
3
 In Seale, the Court also took note of another Florida case, Johnson v. Mullee, 385 
So.2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 392 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1981). In 
diat case, however, the Florida Court of Appeal found under similar circumstances that the 
plaintiff had no cause of action until there was a recurrence or metastatic spread of the 
cancer. Notably, Tohnson was decided under an earlier version of Florida's statute of 
limitations, one which was different from that considered in Swain. 
4
 In Utah, the two-year period for bringing a medical negligence claim "does not 
start to run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an 
injury and that the injury was caused by negligence.55 Seale, at 1363 (citing Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979).) 
been able to protect plaintiffs in delayed diagnosis of cancer cases by ruling that, until there 
is a recurrence, there is no injury and the statute will not run. 
Most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the statute 
of limitations and the one action rule in a way that provides far more protection to plaintiffs 
who ultimately suffer a recurrence, than the Florida Court did in Swain. Rather than 
forcing plaintiffs into premature speculative lawsuits, which preclude them from filing an 
action upon discovery of the ultimate injury, the Utah Supreme Court has, under its statute 
of limitations, extended to plaintiffs the opportunity in every such case to wait and obtain 
full compensation for the ultimate devastating injury. Seale v. Gowans is the controlling 
law in this case and, as noted above, the facts are indistinguishable. Only one claim may be 
brought for injuries arising from the alleged delayed diagnosis of cancer, and regardless of 
the existence of some actual injury in the form of more extensive therapy, the claim cannot 
be brought until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. In the meantime, the plaintiflF 
is protected, for the statute of limitations will not run. 
CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, Mrs. Medved has been in remission since completion of her therapy. 
Any statistical possibility or even probability of recurrence is insufficient to sustain a claim 
under Seale. The presence of allegations, or even evidence, of more extensive medical 
treatment being caused by a delayed diagnosis, even if true, does not alter the outcome. 
If this Court affirms the district courfs Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, for 
the reason that no actionable claim presently exists, plaintiff will have lost comparatively 
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little. If she does suffer a future recurrence, she will retain the right to file a claim for full 
recovery at that time. Only if this Court declines to follow Seale and reverses the district 
court, will plaintiff lose the right to file a claim if her cancer recurs in the future. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants/appellees respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the district court's sound ruling. 
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